Nexus between Terrorism and Organized Criminal groups from the Balkans as threat to EU Security
By Ioannis Michaletos & Darko Trifunovic
Preface
Nowadays in the South East Europe, the existence of
terrorist cells and safe havens is a real threat to the stability and coherence
of the region and for entire Europe indirectly. It is more than certain that
the local leaderships will soon have to cooperate in order to relieve the much
torn-apart South East Europe from this 21st menace.
One has to remember that it took just 8 years of fighting
and preparation in the Afghan War for the Mujahedin to become a global terror-
complex. Expansion of the communications and transport facilitates the spread
of terror organizations. Evan F.
Kohlmann, author of Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network
argues that “key to understanding Al Qaida’s European cells lies in the Bosnian
war of the 1990s”. Using the Bosnian war as their cover, Afghan-trained Islamic
militants loyal to Osama bin Laden convened in the South East Europe in 1992 to
establish a European domestic terrorist infrastructure in order to plot their
violent strikes against the United States
and rest of the World.
The following passages explores the emergence of the modern
Balkan Islamic radicalism and its nexus with organized crime and its importance
in relation to recent political culminations that are of interest for the
security agencies and the intelligence apparatus.
The
Bosnia-Herzegovina vital epicenter
The South East Europe and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular
remains a hot bed for the Islamic driven terrorism in Europe and it should be
noted that they still remain a convenient entrance for the transfer of radicals
from the Middle East. Therefore and due to the political, diplomatic and
historical complexity of the region, a multilateral and highly effective
international response is needed in order to effectively counteract the very
real peril of subversion of the Bosnia and Herzegovina by numerous and highly
dangerous networks composed by international Islamic-oriented terrorist
networks and the associated cells of extremists that have set a foothold in the
area and have been involved with countless acts of violence.
The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and
1995 showed that Islamic fundamentalists had organized entire
terrorist-guerrilla units that arrived from Afghanistan in order to fight in a
jihad together with other like-minded people[1] .
During the civil war, the first nucleuses of terrorist cells of Islamic fundamentalists
in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were established with their
specifics that are reflected in these acts. These specifics are not only ethnic
and cultural-geographical. The fact is that these are completely new ways of
creating a global terrorist network such as what we today call “Al-Qaeda”, but
more precisely its branch in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transformation of the
first guerrilla units of Islamic fundamentalists into terrorist cells capable
of conducting terrorist attacks at anytime and anywhere in the world is
particularly interesting to monitor.
In mid-1992 some 3000 Mujahedin were already present in the
ranks of the Bosnian Army as volunteer forces [2].
They retained their operational autonomy and in essence became an army within
an army. Most of their forces were under the command of General Shakib
Mahmouljin and their area of operations was Zenica. Soon the Mujahedin acquired
the aura of the elite force within the Bosnian Muslim Army and were accounted
for many atrocities against the civilian Christian population[3].
There were instances where the guerrillas didn’t hesitate in presenting
publicly beheaded corpses with the heads of the victims in baskets, a tactic
often used in the Ottoman period as a part of psychological warfare against the
enemy.
Intelligence services of the Nordic-Polish SFOR (previously
IFOR) sector alerted the U.S. of their presence in 1992 while the number of
mujahedeen operating in Bosnia alone continued to grow from a few hundred to
around 6,000 in 1995. Though the Clinton administration had been briefed
extensively by the State Department in 1993 on the growing Islamist threat in
former Yugoslavia, little was done to follow through[4] .
B. Raman (Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat,
Govt. of India, New Delhi) states in the South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No
2251, that “al-Sharq al-Awsat, a Saudi-owned, London-based daily, ran a
front-page story on Abu Abdel Aziz and his activities in Bosnia. In August
1994, “Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path)”, an Islamic journal published
in Pakistan (Issue No. 33), carried an interview with Abu Abdel Aziz. The journal, without identifying his
nationality, reported that Abu Abdel Aziz spoke perfect Urdu and that he had
spent extended periods in Kashmir. It
was stated that Abu Abdel Aziz’s followers, believed to be mostly Indian
Muslims from the Gulf, were part of the seventh battalion of the Bosnian Army
(7th Corp of so called Arm BiH).
B. Raman continues that in the interview he expressed that
“I was one of those who heard about Jihad in Afghanistan when it started. I used to hear about it, but was hesitant
about (the purity and intention of) this Jihad.
One of those who came to our land (presumably Saudi Arabia) was Sheikh
Dr. Abdallah Azzam. I heard him rallying
the youth to come forth and (join him) to go to Afghanistan. This was in 1984 —
I think. I decided to go and check the
matter for myself. This was the beginning
(of my journey with) Jihad. Then the
conquest of Kabul came.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina, just like the entire area of the
Balkans, in the period between the two wars was the main scope of the operation
of Islamic fundamentalists. Because of their actions and connections with the
global network of Islamic fundamentalists, Bosnian and Herzegovina and the
entire Balkan region has become an unavoidable stop for numerous Islamic
fundamentalists on their path to Europe. With a well-developed infrastructure,
a huge amount of funds secured by Islamic countries, as well as Islamic fundamentalists’
general intentions to create an Umma, members of the network considerably
contributed to the rise of the bloody civil war led in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Islamic fundamentalists were practicing and convoying their ideology of
violence by all possible means. The processes and acts by which Islamic
fundamentalists circles reached their peak followed the revolution in Iran. The
main goal of Islamic fundamentalists was the establishment of a Muslim state in
the heart of Europe, which would be regulated by Islamic standards. Whether it
was about political activities or various forms of violence, the end sanctifies
the means.
Civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995
showed that Islamic fundamentalists have organized entire terrorist-guerrilla
units that arrived from Afghanistan in order to fight in a jihad together with
other like-minded people. During the civil war, the first nucleuses of
terrorist cells of Islamic fundamentalists in the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had been established with their specific goals that are reflected
in these acts. These specific goals are not only ethnic and
cultural-geographical. The fact is that these are completely new ways of
creating a global terrorist network which we call today “Al-Qaeda”, or more
precisely its branch in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transformation of guerrilla
units of Islamic fundamentalists into terrorist cells capable of conducting
terrorist attacks at anytime and anywhere in the world is particularly
interesting to monitor.
Certainly, the terrorist threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina does
not come solely from the Wahhabis; one should not underestimate the role of the
Iranian intelligence, which can leverage the experience of theocracy, powerful
organization and local support among the ruling circles of the Bosnian Muslims
(Haris Silajdžić, Bakir Izetbegović, Hasan Čengić, Omer Behmen, Edhem Bičakčić,
Džemaludin and Nedžad Latić) to pose a danger to Bosnia itself, as well as
regional and global stability[5] .
By the same token, Wahhabi beliefs are not an altogether negative phenomenon in
the Arab world. For example, it is the official outlook on Islam in Saudi
Arabia, and has informed their process of liberation from the Ottoman Empire,
and their subsequent conservative social organization. By advocating a puritan
outlook on Islam, Wahhabism is actually a reform movement in many Arab
societies. In well-ordered societies, even “stable dictatorships,” Wahhabism is
not a threat.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, Wahhabism is the principal
means of radicalizing the population. It is militant and exclusive, an ideology
of hatred distinguished by a rigid interpretation of Islam [6].
It appeals primarily to the semi-literate and dispossessed rural and suburban
populations, who serve as its foot soldiers, and the corrupt profiteers and
usurers from Sarajevo, Zenica, Travnik and other Muslim centers.
By its nature, Wahhabism is a fundamentalist movement
advocating the return to Islam’s original and basic teachings. It is openly
hostile to the Shia, Sufi and other liberal Islamic teachings. When Wahhabis
refer to their movement, they often call it a “revival” of Islam, a restoration
of the faith in its original, pure form, without Western innovations and
Oriental decadence alike. Wahhabism calls for the rejection of modernism and
the return to the glorious past of the first Muslims. In fact, Wahhabis often
prefer to be called the Salafi, the “forerunners” or inheritors of the
“original” Islam. Wahhabis are recognizable
by their physical appearance, customs and behavior. They wear long beards but
short hair, and their trousers are rolled up or cut off at the ankles. They
rarely communicate or associate with others. When they pray, they do so with
their feet and elbows spread out, hitting the floor, thus signaling their
determination to fight and sacrifice for Islam. These men are prepared not just
to die in the jihad, but to bring death to as many others as they deem
necessary. Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina first appeared in the 1980s, with
the students returning from religious schools in from Arab countries.
It has spread significantly following the war, with the
influx of foreign Wahhabis and aid from Gulf countries on the first floor from
Saudi Arabia. Aid from Islamic countries (in particular Saudi Arabia) was
focused on social program such as building madrassas (Islamic schools) and
funding program for war orphans, and infrastructural reconstruction projects
(the rebuilding of mosques in the Muslim-dominated parts of Bosnia &
Herzegovina). But the aid came with conditions. Saudi money has indeed helped
fund social program and reconstruction of mosques, but the character of Islamic
places of worship has changed significantly as a consequence.
In the ten-year period since the end of armed conflict in
Bosnia, around 550 new mosques have been built - primarily in the Wahhabi style[7] .
Thanks to mentioned process, today, however, the Wahhabi community in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is led by native converts, numbering daily and provoking
troubles and valance claiming to act in the name of Islam[8] .
Worldwide, Wahhabism is the most widespread in poor and backwater parts of
Asia. It has been linked to terrorist activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, leading to an association in the West between Wahhabism and Al-Qaeda,
not altogether undeserved. Thanks to the backing of the most powerful Islamic
financiers and the favor of certain governments, Wahhabis are slowly but
certainly gaining converts throughout the Muslim world. The financial
contributions of many Wahhabi followers – including the Muslims in Bosnia -
have been used to fund the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Europe[9].
A past surge in Wahhabi activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina is
directly related to the return of the former commander of the “El mujahedin”
unit of the Bosnian Army, an Egyptian by the name of Imad al-Misri. After the
street demonstrations in Egypt, a large number of radical Islamists were released
by the opponents of the now former President Mubarak. Prior to his extradition
to Egypt, Al-Misri, also known as Eslam Durmo, resided in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Al-Misri wasted
little time upon returning to Bosnia. He began preaching right away. On
February 13, 2011 in Sarajevo and the following day in Travnik, he spoke of the
proper role of women in Islam. On April 24 in Bugojno, he preached about the
evils causing strife within Islam[10] .
Al-Misri’s radical Egyptian faction (fraction of Ayman al Zawahiri) is growing
in influence, and may well take the leadership within Al-Qaeda after the death
of Osama bin Laden.
Another disturbing illustration was the May 13, 2011 sermon
of Imam Bilal Bosnić of the Bihać mosque, glorifying Osama bin Laden as a true
Muslim believer, a martyr on the path of Allah who fell fighting the vile
infidel [11].
From Imam Bilal Bosnic speech: “Dear brothers, imagine how much a singer, an artist, a doctor, an
American president would neeed to spend on billboards and advertising, before
the entire world would know them. Hitler killed fifty-plus million people. See
if you can have a petition drive in Germany to declare him a terrorist. Or
anywhere in Western Europe. But today, when the media are our main source of
knowledge, and when we have forsaken the word of Allah, anyone can convince us
to believe in garbage. And so they tell us that most Muslims consider a man who
spent his entire wealth and gave his life to raise the banner of Islam to be a
terrorist. Does he care? Will the Almighty judge by the verdicts of the
corrupt? Or will He judge by His own will? Now Americans say they had to spend
$300 billion. Let them be aware, they did not kill Allah. They cannot kill the
idea of Islam. Our heroes, they lay down their lives for the Cause. That is the
proof of their faith. After their death, their every word weighs heavily on the
scales of True Believers. Only then every word of the one who sealed his
Islamiyet (faith) with his life comes to matter“.
According to a past report
by Juan Carlos Antúnez, the Bosnian Wahhabi movement is currently
comprised of two main streams[12] :
- A Salafi / Wahhabi stream loyal to the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Islamic Community;
- A Salafi / Wahhabi stream outside the control of the
Bosnian and Herzegovina Islamic Community. This stream can also be divided into
two main groups: Missionary and Jihadi.
It seems that for the long-term purposes of further
subversion of radical elements of the Bosnian Wahhabi networks into Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the infiltration of the religious structure of the mainstream
Muslim community is needed. A security report by the ISN, comments on the
“Bosnian Muslim cleric Muhamed Porca, who has served as the head of the
Vienna-based Al-Tawhid Mosque since 1993. Bosnian intelligence believes he is
the main source of financial and ideological support for the Bosnian Wahhabi movement[13] .
Another of Porca’s associates, the recently arrested Nusret
Imamovic, entered the spotlight after the first leader of Gornja Maoca,
Sabahudin Fiuljanin (also a holder of residence permit in Vienna) was arrested
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2002 by US forces, who followed him home
after observing him outside a US military base in the city of Tuzla on several
occasions. In his apartment, soldiers found a shoulder-held rocket launcher and
several different passports, along with a last will and testament. Fiuljanin
was released in early 2003 under pressure from human rights groups who
protested the suspect's lack of rights to a lawyer while in detention. Since
then he has lived in Sarajevo. Fiuljanin was then replaced by Imamovic, a naturalized
Austrian citizen who served as the local imam in the town of Kalesija and spent
his time shuffling back and forth between Vienna and Gornja Maoca. Imamovic
became better known to the Bosnian public when he and six other Wahhabis, three
of them Austrian citizens, assaulted a Bosnian Serb near Gornja Maoca in 2006.
After a short trial, the seven were given symbolic sentences and released on
parole. Some of them returned to Vienna.
Imamovic also runs an extremist website www.putvjernika.com, which
glorifies jihad and tabulates number of dead Americans in the war on terror.
Imamovic has previously attracted public attention by his statement on the
website that suicide attacks are not forbidden by Islam, and that they should
be used in “exceptional circumstances.” During the 2009, SIPA (Bosnian State
Security Agency) opened an investigation into the website, suspecting it is
serving as a recruitment point for Bosnian Wahhabis to fight against US-led
coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, through the distribution of
propaganda material [14].
Narcotics and the
emergence of crime syndicates in the Balkans
The main threat to the Balkans nowadays, is the existence of
well organized criminal groups that to an extent are an integral part of the
world wide “Crime Syndicates” that for the most part control the narcotics
trade in our époque. The infamous Balkan
drugs route[15] is the
main path by which narcotics and specifically heroine; are smuggled to European
countries. It is actually a network of contrabands, corrupted public officials
and war lords that make sure that the heroine produced in Afghanistan is smoothly transferred
to the European addicts.
According to the Council of Foreign affairs[16], Afghanistan
has almost tripled its heroin production and in 2005 32,000 acres were reserved
for poppy cultivation, out of 12,000 acres in 2004. Between 2002 and 2013
Afghanistan came to dominate almost 90% of world’s heroin production[17].This
fact shows first of all the total failure by the NATO Forces in that country to
create the necessary framework for the reconstruction process. As far as the
ramifications for the Balkans are concerned, the increased profits by criminal
gangs have boasted them with tremendous riches and political influence.
There are mainly two organized ethnic groups that deal most
of the arrangements concerning the organized crime in the Balkans. The
so-called Albanian mafia[18]
and the Turkish crime syndicates[19]. The
Albanian organized crime is very active since the collapse of the Communist
rule in this country that opened the way for various indigenous gangs to spread
their wings further and take part in one
of the most profitable commerce of all times, namely drugs. A leading French criminologist Xavier Raufer[20]
has extensively dealt with the issue of the Albanian mafia. He considers the
Albanians as the only true “Mafia” in the Balkans due to the peculiar social
structure of their society in the Northern parts of the country “The land of
the Genghis”.
An isolated society with very firm beliefs in issues of
honor and manhood pride coupled with severe social problems and a culture of
vendetta; has been transformed into a huge international crime network. Various
reports[21]
indicate that roughly 70-80% of the heroin distributed in European is under Albanian
control, a really impressive percentage for a nation of just 6 million people.
Moreover in the Balkan route –In reality three distinct routes-, the Albanian
mafia plays a vital role in safeguarding the interests of the world drugs trade
by having its “Soldiers” and “Capos” along the way and protecting shipments
from police and official interruption.
Furthermore Albania
as a country is a major producer of Cannabis[22],
which is mainly exported to neighboring Greece
and Turkey .
The narcotics traded is placed along the trafficking and illegal immigrant
smuggling[23]
operations that have seen the Albanians gaining the fame as the most powerful
and dangerous criminal group in South Eastern Europe .
In Greece
alone the revenues from prostitution run at around 7.5 billion USD[24],
a large portion of that being controlled by Albanian criminal groups.
Trafficking of women from Albania
is one of the main ways to establish a “War chest” for the organized crime, in
order to invest its wealth in the drugs trade.
In essence the first stage for every respectable organized
crime unit, is to establish a prostitution ring, make easily large amounts of
cash, and then invest them for the drugs trade by constructing the expensive
logistics bases, fake companies, pay corrupted officials and so on. Therefore
when looking into the different aspects of organized criminal activity, one
should note that all forms of that activity are interconnected and that each
one leads to the other. That actually is one of the differences of organized
crime from the other forms of criminality[25].
Back to the activities of the Albanian criminal groups, the
recent history illustrates the existence of a hybrid criminal form[26],
meaning the interconnection between criminal activities and terrorism. The
Albanian groups that are mostly active in the North of the country have been
associated with the preparations of the U.C.K guerilla forces in the late 90’s,
as well as, with their arming and training[27].
The troubling 90’s in South Eastern Europe saw
the convergence of the drugs trade along with the formation of radical Islamic
groups and the pervasion of corruption in the upper echelons on the countries
involved. In the Albanian case the past decade it is assumed that the country
is facing a virtual take over of its institution by the organized crime that in
its turn has been linked with international terrorism, with Al Qaeda
withstanding[28].
The main role of the Albanian Mafia in the narcotics trade
is the one of wholesale distributor of Afghan heroine. Along the Balkan route
and especially the one passing through Southern Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia; the
Albanians import heroin and then dispense it to Italy, or Bosnia- Croatia to
Austria and Central Europe. After 1999 and the consequent Albanian dominance in
Kosovo, Pristina has become the unquestionable narcotics capital of Europe [29].
A traditionally provisional city in the midst of the Balkans is nowadays the
epicenter of all drugs deal of an area encompassing Central Europe, Balkans,
and Middle East .
The lack of law coupled with the existence of a society
reluctant to pursue organized crime, has created a “black hole” in the centre
of the Balkans that primarily lives on criminal activities and the remittances
of the Kosovo-Albanian Diaspora[30].
The latter is strategically located in countries such as Switzerland , Austria ,
Germany and Denmark
and dominates the European heroin trade. Despite the fact that Albanians are
relatively newcomers to the European organized crime scene-Like the old-timers
Sicilians, Corsicans and Irish- the have
already taken over the entire European heroin market and make large advances in
the sectors of trafficking, racketeering, arms smuggling and illegal gambling[31].
The infamous Albanian mafia is a formidable criminal
network, but the existence of another one, influential as well, should be added
in order to examine the whole spectrum of drugs trade in the Balkans. The
Turkish crime syndicates are the undisputable partner of the Albanians. It
would not be possible for the Albanians to become distributors in the first
place if the weren’t able to acquire their good from the East, and that is
where the role of the Turks begins.
The heroin to be sold was transported with ships to Sicily , and then to Marseilles
were the Corsicans had created labs for the fabrication of the commercial
product. From then onwards it was transferred to New York
and other USA
ports where the American-Italian mafia would assure its allocation in the
end-users, the heroin addicts. The forceful USA administration at that time
declared a war against narcotics and obliged the Turks to seek other sources of
the lucrative opium. Soon enough Turkish operational production bases were
established in Afghanistan
and Northern Pakistan . The war in the former
during the 80’s, as well as, the resurge of the Kurdish guerilla fighting after
1984[35]
and the Iraq-Iranian war[36]
the same period; created a convergence of political, criminal and military
operations based in heroin trade.
Events such as the Iran-Contra[37]
scandal illuminate how far the heroin trade has penetrated the higher echelons
of the world’s decision-making process and how it interacts with the
international affairs. Moreover the effective destruction of Beirut
during the 80’s collapsed the cities ubiquitous reputation as the prime port
for narcotics trade and this role was overtaken by Istanbul [38]. The situation after the end of the Cold War
in 1989, found the Turks financially strong from their trade in the previous
decades and also ready enough to pursue stronger ties with the countries of
Central Asia, an aim vividly supported by the USA administrations.
Furthermore the appearance of the Albanians and the civil
wars in former Yugoslavia ,
provided ample of human resources in the Balkans, eager in getting involved in
the drugs trade so as to survive financially or gain capital to achieve their
political aims. Europe now already hosted considerable Turkish
minorities-Especially Germany [39] -
and individuals from those Turkish communities were used to act as local retail
agents for the heroin distribution in Europe .
In 1996 the Susurluk accident[40]
revealed to Turkey
the extent where the Drug –Lords have penetrated the upper crust of the society
and they were able to conduct their businesses untouched by the law[41].
Even the spouse of the then Turkish Prime Minister Tancu Tsiller[42]
has been widely accused for close interactions with notable underworld figures.
Furthermore the accusations that the Turkish security forces were conducting
drugs trade in South Eastern Turkey[43]
were in relation to the civil strife in that region because of the Kurdish
fight and that presents once more that politics and criminal groups seem to go
hand in hand.
The modus opperandi of the Turkish organized crime in drugs
trade follows the role of the coordinator and distributor. Large amounts of
heroin shipments enter Turkey
each month and then delivered through the Balkan route mostly, to all over Europe [44].
It has to be noted that the country with the largest Turkish community-Germany-
is being used also as a redistribution centre. That means that when heroin
reaches Germany , it is being
handed out from there to the other major European markets, especially UK and Scandinavia .
Moreover some of the strongest “Capo” of the Turkish syndicates resided in Germany
and generally speaking this country has become the centre of gravity for the
Turkish drug barons, as far as, their posture in the European narcotics scene
is concerned[45]. Further
the impact of the Turkish drug lords has alarmed European security agencies due
to the importance of their overall contribution in the narcotics market in the
Continent. For instances since the 1970s, Turkey
has accounted for between 75 and 90 per cent of all heroin in the UK .
The key traffickers are Turks or criminals who operate along that route using
Turkish contacts[46].
The alliance of Turkish and Albanian crime groups[47]
can be explained at first glance by the cultural, religious and ethnic links –A
large percentage of Turks in W. Turkey has
Albanian ancestry-[48].
Also, the tradition of the Albanians to join and serve larger ethnic groups
with whom they feel to have a kind of affinity might have its explanation. The
same was he case in USA and New York especially[49]
where for decades the Albanian crime syndicates tended to operate under the
aegis and influence of the much stronger American-Sicilian crime corporations.
It is more than certain that if Western societies along with
their partners in the Balkans; cannot control the narcotics trade their
incompetence will certainly spill over to the overall antiterrorist security
framework that they are trying to enforce. The Hybrid forms that modern crime
is currently experiencing will most certainly ensure the continuous flow of
capital to terrorist enterprises along with the recruitment of loyal assistants
and the corruption of public officials in sensitive sectors of the public
sectors. The initiatives[50]
by the heads of state of the Balkans to curb on organized crime should give the
opportunity for further decisive measures. Balkans have already being developed
as Europe’s soft underbelly-Not quite as Churchill imagined- and one of the top priorities of the EU has
to be the unquestionable joint effort to “close down” the Balkan route,
achieving thus a real advance against terrorism in a worldwide level.
Organized crime
outlook in Albania & Bulgaria
Since the end of the Communist era in the Balkans in the
early 90’s, organized crime activities have soared, by expanding their
activities in fields such as narcotics, trafficking, racketeering and goods
smuggling. The civil wars in Yugoslavia
and the continuous strife in Albania
provided an excellent framework on which crime syndicates became stronger and
gained political and societal clout.
The first and foremost criminal group that can be to an
extent classified as a “Mafia” is the Albanian organized crime[51].
Its geographical spread is in and between the triangle Pristina (Kosovo) –
Tetovo (FYROM) and Tirana (Albania ).
During the 1999 and the NATO campaign against Serbia, it was a common secret
amongst the members of the international community that the KLA army was
financed and assisted by the organized crime that hoped to achieve a safe haven
in the Kosovo area[52].
The importance of Pristina is mainly associated with its use as a transit point
in the infamous Balkan drugs route. Moreover the capital of Kosovo is a massive
hideout for heads of crime syndicates across the Balkans and beyond[53].
Furthermore the high unemployment rate in the region along
with the chronic industrial decay, have forced masses of the population to
remain tolerant –at beast- in the practices of illegal activity[54].
The capital flowing from heroin trade mostly, have helped towards the
revitalization of the local economies. To that point it is interesting to note
that 4/5 of the heroin flowing to Europe from Asia (Afghanistan )
is being transferred by Albanians that have established bases all across Europe
from Oslo to Barcelona
and from Budapest to Rome [55].
The Albanian organized crime as Xavier Raufer has pointed out operates on a
dual basis[56]. That
means it has also the function of a strong societal force that virtually
governs peripheral areas of Albania ,
mostly in the North, as well as, Kosovo currently. The Albanian crime
syndicates work in close contacts with their American-Albanian counterparts
that are mainly located in New York , New Jersey and Philadelphia [57].
Since 1991 quite a few Kosovo-Albanians have managed under not-so-legal ways,
to immigrate to USA
and act as liaison with the European community.
This highly sophisticated criminal network has been able to
control much of the drugs trade in Europe and also the trafficking of women and
children from the Balkans to Western Europe .
Both of these activities are complementary to each other and frequently
criminal groups switch from one activity to the other[58].
The ethnic conflicts in Former Yugoslavia, provided ample
opportunities for weapons smuggling that reached unprecedented proportions in
1997. The same year a civil unrest in Albania , led to the overthrow of the
government and the lack of the rule of law for almost 6 months. During this
period 700,000 Kalashnikov and about 200,000 Albanian passports were stolen[59].
Consequently a large portion of the above was sold to criminal groups in the
Balkans and in Europe , whilst there are many
allegations of terrorist connection whereby Al Qaeda members were able to
obtain Albanian passports and an easier access to the European Continent[60].
Islamic terrorism
and the Balkans: The perfect training ground
The emergence of radical – militant Islam during the 90’s is
a very complicated issue that involves worldwide actors, social dynamics and a
deep knowledge of the religious realm of the Islamic world. This article aims
to present and inform for the events that shaped Islamic terrorism in the
Balkans. In this corner of Europe , the past 15
years, the roots of Islamic radicalism have deepened and it is of the outermost
importance to comprehend this phenomenon, so as to be able to combat it.
The beginning of the Yugoslavian civil strife in 1991
presented an excellent chance for the Mujahedin to get into Europe via the
ethno-cultural conflict between Christians and Muslims in Bosnia . These religious mercenaries
had proved their aptitude in war from the early 80’s when they fought the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan ,
and managed to inflict great damages to it using Western assistance.
The West at that period, along with its regional allies,
promoted the creation of the so-called “Green Arch”[61].
That meant the creation of strong Islamic pockets in areas of Soviet influence,
or in border countries that deemed important for the strategy of the West
against the Soviets. Thus Afghanistan ,
Pakistan , Caucasus, and in Turkey
(through the use of the Turkish “Hezbollah”), became radicalized during the
80’s.
What the West could not comprehend and predict at that
period, is the “Genie out of the bottle” effect. Once these radicals groups
gained access to armaments and training, they became autonomous and sought to
create their own agenda. Therefore the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the trial
test of their newly founded role.
In mid-1992 some 3000 -3500 Mujahedin were already present
in the ranks of the Bosnian Army as volunteer forces. They retained their
operational autonomy and in essence became an army within an army[62].
Most of their forces were under the command of General Shakib Mahmouljin and
their area of operations was Zenica. Soon the Mujahedin acquired the aura of
the elite force within the Bosnian Muslim Army and were accounted for many atrocities
against the civilian Christian population. There were instances where the
guerillas didn’t hesitate in presenting publicly beheaded corpses with the
heads of the victims in baskets, a tactic often used in the Ottoman period as a
part of psychological warfare against the enemy.
During the Bosnian war, the Al-Qaeda was beginning to emerge
as a world wide Islamic force that intended to strike the West with all means
possible. One of the key elements in its success would be to get a hold of
“safe havens” in Europe [63].
The situation in Bosnia
was the opportunity wanted, and soon logistic bases were established within the
Bosnian territory. Moreover a campaign of recruiting Bosnian Muslims to the Al
–Qaeda cause, resulted in the creation of “Islamic pockets” in the middle of
the Balkans. By the end of 1995 and the subsequent Dayton treaty that ended the war; hundreds of
Mujahedin fighters were permanent residents of the established
Bosnia-Herzegovina state, and acquired the citizenship of that country[64].
The USA
security agencies have revealed that two of the hijackers in 9/11 attacks, had
toured the Balkans and were trained in an Al-Qaeda camp in Bosnia [65].
In addition the explosives used in the 7/7 attacks in London came from the Balkans[66],
an event that portrays the tremendous lack of perspective that the West had
when it tolerated the emergence of such networks.
The sensitive issue of the Kosovo status is also interlinked
with the presence of terrorism –Of an Islamic nature- and its ramifications are
much more extended than conventionally thought. Moreover the impact of Islamic
driven terrorism in the Balkans is not only restrained in the region but has
global consequences, thus it needs multiparty intelligence cooperation in order
to be dealt with. Worries about Kosovo morphing into a safe haven for
terrorists are not without merit. After all, radical Islamic elements aided
some Kosovars--and earlier, Bosnian Muslims--in the ethno-religious warfare
that destroyed Yugoslavia
in the 1990s. For example, Australian al-Qaeda fighter David Hicks traveled to
the Balkans to join the notorious Kosovo Liberation Army. Hicks completed
military training at a KLA camp and later fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan , where U.S. forces apprehended him[67].
The Albanian
nationalism and the Islamic terrorism
As in the case of Bosnia ,
the Albanian Muslims (70% of the population) proved to be a magnet for the
Islamists that sought to regain a foothold in Europe .
The conditions by which Albania was freed by the Communist regime in the early
90’s, revealed the existence of a backward isolated country with no interaction
with the rest of the world. The transition from a central command structure to
that of a free market; ensured the development of multiple societal forces
within the much repressed Albanian society[68].
In early 1994 the infamous Osama Bin Laden, paid a visit to
Tirana, presumably to oversight the networking of his activities there. He came
back in 1998 to oversight Al-Qaeda training camps in the Northern part of Albania ,
just across the borders with Kosovo[69].
The trainers –of Arabic origin mostly- were assigned to train the newly
recruits of the Usthria Climirtare e Kosoves –U.C.K- units for the forthcoming
guerilla warfare against the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.
The then Albanian Director of the Albanian secret
service-SHIK-named Fatos Klosi admitted the training that took place in these
camps and the existence of “Jihad warriors” from Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt that were responsible for the instruction of the UCK army. To this
point it is important to add to the above, the existence of the Albanian Arab
Islamic Bank, that was used for the financing of terrorist activities
throughout the Balkans. Various sources indicate the existence of Bin Laden’s
backing in the bank’s capital, with the sum of 11 million USD[70].
In 1997, the financial collapse of Albania by an economic scandal that
shook the country; had as a result the social unrest throughout the territory
and the collapse of the rule of law[71].
An uncounted number of armaments were stolen during the period of the riots
from the Albanian’s Army caches, and the bulk of it ended in the hands of the
UCK and its Islamist collaborators. Until early 1998 USA characterized UCK as a
terrorist organization, due to its connection with well-known figures of the
extremist elements of the Islamic world. Nevertheless, the American policy
changed its direction since it deemed the existence of Milosevic more
threatening at that period than the Islamic movement[72].
During the skirmishes and fights before the NATO bombings in March 1999, the
Yugoslav Army managed to inflict great damages to the Mujahedin fighters that
were combating along the UCK lines[73].
In Urocevac the bulk of them was eliminated by the Serbian Army and was obliged
to retreat back in their safe havens in Northern Albania .
After the end of the 1999 war, the Mujahedin networks
regrouped and started to infiltrate the Kosovo area in great numbers[74].
That included the mushrooming of Islamic charitable funds across the region,
the construction of Mosques and the radicalization of the local Albanian
population[75] and the
wider Muslim populations of the ex-Yugoslavia.
It is interesting to note that the Albanian population in
its majority cannot be conceived as a fundamentalist Islamic nation and the
extremists are for the time being a forceful minority of that nation. The
Islamic expansion in the Balkans is coupled with the existence of the criminal
syndicates that are all prevalent in the Balkan Peninsula .
Since the terrorist activities cannot be financed through the use of the legal
free market economy, the use of narcotics and trafficking illegal trade has
enabled the flourishing of the terrorist networks[76].
The “Hybrid” organizations as the merged terrorist and criminal are named[77],
has created the necessary framework for the Balkans to enter in one of the
worst periods of their modern history. The leading criminologist Loretta
Napoleoni has researched articulately the issue and offers illuminating
approaches as to the extent of the infiltration of crime & terrorism in
world economy.
According to her recent interview for balkanalysis.com[78],
some 1.5 trillion USD are the revenue of the organized crime worldwide. A fair
portion of that is being achieved by controlling the “Balkan drugs route” a
geographical area that encompasses Kosovo, Northern
Albania and Tetovo. More or less the Islamic terrorism network has
located some of its bases, along the way of some of the most lucrative criminal
areas of Europe . Therefore it is able to
increase its revenues and finance its monstrous acts.
In spring 2001, the Mujahedin forces, once again, were brought
to day-light by joining the National Liberation Army in its fight in Western FYROM [79].
The NLA was a composition of various Albanian fractions that along with the
Islamic extremists sought to prepare the basis for the disintegration of FYROM[80].
There is a large Albanian minority in the country, which also happens to be
located right in the centre of the Balkans and where the “Balkan drug route”
passes by. The Mujahedin formed the majority of the 113 brigade of NLA[81],
and were accused of many atrocities against innocent civilians of Slavic
descent.
On August 2001 the Ohrid accord was signed and the conflict
ceased without any real gains by the Albanian side[82].
A month later, the attack on the twin towers revealed to the world the spread
and the power the terrorist organizations have amassed, thus the “War on
terror” begun and to a great extent dismantled the world wide Islamic terrorist
web.
SEVEN KEY AL-QAEDA
MEMBERS WHO DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TOOK PART IN 9/11 AND ARE LINKED TO
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA[83]
Nawaf al Hazmi, a Saudi.
He was a September 11th hijacker.
He fought in BiH in 1995.
Khalid al-Mihdhar, from Yemen . He also was a September 11th hijacker. He also fought in BiH with the foreign
mujahideen battalion in Bosnia
in 1995
Sheikh Omar abd-al Rahman (convicted of the 1993 attack on
the WTC) was connected with the so-called humanitarian organization TWRA, which
was a cover for terrorists. Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic made personal
guarantees for TWRA’s general director and personal friend Elfatih Hassanein,
so he could open an account with Die Erste Osterreich Bank in Vienna , Austria
Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who recruited Mohamed Atta into
Al-Qaeda, had a terrorist base in Bosnia . Zammar is also responsible
for recruiting two of Atta’s lieutenants, Ramzi Binalsahib and Said Bahaji.
Osama bin Laden received a Bosnian passport from the Embassy
in Vienna , Austria
Abu al-Ma’ali (Abdelkader Mokhtari), a senior Al-Qaeda
operative, was stationed in Bosnia
until recently. Just a few years ago, US officials used to call him “Osama Bin
Laden, Jr.”
Bensayah Belkacem was arrested in Bosnia in October 2001. Numbers
saved in his cell phone connected him with at least one top-rank associate of
Bin Laden
The “White
Al-Qaeda” in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Information available to experts on international terrorism
indicate that B-H is at this time one of the most dangerous countries in
Europe, as it represents a nursery for potential Islamic terrorists – the so
called “white” or “European” Al-Qaeda[84].
Money from Islamic countries that is laundered through “humanitarian”
organizations finances the religious education of at least 100,000 young
Bosnian Muslims[85]. In
addition to such education, which follows the interpretations of Wahhabi Islam,
there is another type of “training” in various officially registered camps
throughout the B-H Federation[86].
There, the young and carefully selected Wahhabis attend “additional courses” in
marksmanship, explosives and martial arts[87].
Organizations such as “Furqan,” the “Active Islamic Youth,” the “Muslim Youth
Council” and others – differing only in name and primary donors, but otherwise
interchangeable – teach young Muslims computer and Internet skills, so they
could establish contacts with their coreligionists worldwide. Knowing all this,
the former head of UN Mission in Bosnia Jacques Paul Klein recently said that
some 200 mujahid’din in Bosnia did not represent a danger, because they can be
easily controlled.Klein knew it would be a lot more difficult to stop the
spread of young Bosnian Wahhabis throughout Europe, youths who consider Osama
Bin Laden and the mujahid’din role models[88]. Nowadays
there is still a strong presence of a variety of extremist Islamic groups in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the pretext of charity funds and related
philanthropic establishments[89].
Thus it is not of surprise that the U.K Foreign Office still warrants concern
safety for every British national traveling there, especially in relation to
potential terrorist incidents[90].
“Balkan Jihad” & narcoterror
After the 9/11, a worldwide “War on terror” begun in order
to disband and neutralize Islamic terrorist networks across the globe. The main
focus of the largest anti-terrorist campaign in history is focused in the
Middle East area, as well as in Afghanistan .
Evan F. Kohlmann, author of Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe : The Afghan-Bosnian Network argues that “key to
understanding Al Qaida’s European cells lies in the Bosnian war of the 1990s”[91].
Using the Bosnian war as their cover, Afghan-trained Islamic militants loyal to
Osama bin Laden convened in the Balkans in 1992 to establish a European
domestic terrorist infrastructure in order to plot their violent strikes
against the United States
So, the outbreak of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
1992 presented an unparalleled opportunity for the international Mujaheedin to
storm Europe , establish safe havens in the
area and thus initiate re-conquest of regions they previously ruled[92].
The leader of Bosnia ,
Alia Izebegovic was eager to obtain as much assistance as possible and didn’t
hesitate in providing the necessary framework by which the Islamic ties were
forged[93].
In the same year, a variety of Islamic mercenaries flocked into the Balkans in
order to support the “Holy cause”, meaning the establishment of the first
Islamic state in Europe [94].
The end of the war in 1995 saw quite a few of those mujahedin, acquiring
Bosnian citizenship and establishing the first Islamic community in the village of Bocinja Donja Southern
Serbia ; has become a core for Islamic fundamentalism, linked with
Al-Qaeda cells. Novi Pazar is the focus of the Islamist attempt to build a
landbridge from Albania and
Kosovo to Bosnia .
Further to the East, in southern Serbia ’s
Raška Oblast, are three other concentrations of Muslims: Sjenica and Pester
area (lightly populated but mostly Muslim), Prijepolje (some 50 percent Muslim)
and — very close to the Bosnia
border where Republica Srpska controls the slender Gorazde corridor — Priboj
(also some 50 percent Muslim). The land between is Serbian farmland, but the
Islamist goal is to link the cities as “evidence” that the entire region is, or
should be, Muslim territory. The same strategy worked successfully in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbian farmers were driven off their lands during
the civil war.
Just south of the Serbian area of Raška Oblast is the
Montenegrin part of Raška region, where, for example, Bijeljo Polje is some 60
to 80 percent Muslim, and Pijevlja, close to the Bosnian border, is about 40
percent Muslim. These Montenegrin towns, like those of the Western Serbian
Raška region, are the key to the illicit arms and narcotrafficking across the
Gorazde Corridor to Bosnia .
A new Islamist university has opened in Novi Pazar, ostensibly
a normal college, but led by an Islamist mufti of little formal education. This
modern institution — whose officials proclaim it a normal educational
institution — reveals its character in its symbol: the Wahabbi/Salafi Dawa
symbol, an open Q’uran surmounted with a rising sun. The university, in a
renovated former textile factory, is a known center of radical Islamist
thinking. A book fair held there in early October 2003 distributed very radical
Islamist literature, specifically advocating conflict with the West.
The Dawa sign indicates that the university is predominantly
Saudi-funded, although some Western funding is known to have been pumped into
the institution, reportedly largely to undermine Serb interests in the region[97].
Western tolerance of Islamic radicals, however, was one of
the gravest mistakes of modern times[98].
In addition, a well organized criminal network has already been established in Sarajevo that in a large extent facilitates illegal
immigration from Asia to Europe [99].
That activity is coupled with the narcotics trade that is being supplemented by
the infamous “Balkan Drug route”[100].
It is illuminating to note that the areas from where this route is passing are
under Muslim influence mostly.
One of the biggest problems is certainly the drug trade,
which directly affects EU countries. Seventy percent of all heroins arriving to
the EU come down three Balkans routes. BH is part of one of the routes, but is
increasingly becoming a storage zone for illicit narcotics and an emerging market,
as the number of users grows. Local crime syndicates are connected with
Albanian, Kosovo, Serb, Turkish and Bulgarian mafias. There are two heroin
routes into BH: One starts in Afghanistan, through Turkey, Greece, Albania and
Serbia, and then through BH westwards. The second starts in Albania, and then
goes across Montenegro into southern BH and Croatia, to proceed into Western
Europe [101].
This recent situation is being exploited by various Islamic
fundamentalist terrorist organizations in BH. During the civil war, some of the
Muslim military commanders were petty criminals such as Ramiz Delalic – CELO[102] (deputy commander, 9th Motorised Brig.),
Ismet Bajramovic – CELO (Military police commander[103]
), Musan Topalovic – CACO[104] and Jusuf -Juka Prazina[105]
. Also, members of the mentioned group are: Sead Becirevic-Sejo, Zulfikar
Alic-Zuka (Military commander of the terrorist unit call Black Swans) and
Bojadzic Nihat, former officer of the R BiH Army. Political support to this
group secure on of the prominent Muslim politician in Sarajevo Mr.Ejup Ganic
and Mr.Haris Silajdzic. Haris Silajdzic are the actual member of the B-H
Presidency. His sister Salidza Silajdzic is married in Iran, presumably to a
high rank officer of the VEVAK, and his brother Husref Silajdzic is thought to
be a secret agent of the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI). New information
speak about the fact that Haris Silajdzic is trying to restart the work of
“Patriot League”[106]. The center of “Patriot League” is to be in
Sarajevo with General Vahid Karavelic as its head.
Terrorist networks have seized upon these advantages of
local criminals-turned-Islamic fundamentalists, creating a new model of
terrorist funding.
While terrorists and criminal syndicates have different
motivations, they both seek financial gain – only terrorists see it as a source
of funding their ideological pursuits. As a result, terrorist networks in
cooperation with organized crime syndicates generate significant sums of money.
Both parties profit from cooperation. Terrorists provide drug supplies, weapons
and contacts to drug-makers and smugglers worldwide. They also provide safe
havens for organized crime syndicates, because they often control large
territories where there is no rule of law. On the other hand, the terrorists
can use smuggling routes and illicit trade goods. Both groups gather and
exchange intelligence on corrupt state officials in all branches of government.
Islamic fundamentalists, including Al-Qaeda members, realize
profits from drug trade in two ways. One is by taking a percentage from the
local criminal syndicates, and the other is taking a portion of illicit
substances transported towards Western Europe. Profits from those drug sales
are used by the terrorists to purchase arms and offer bribes, but increasingly
often as well for hiring professional PR and lobbying firms to come up with
political justifications of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists.
Recent discoveries in BH indicate that the trend of
terrorist organizations funding themselves from drug sales is on the rise, due
to a series of factors:
1. Financial
scrutiny and closing of so-called “humanitarian” organizations that were terror
fronts;
2. Greater
pressure on state sponsors of terrorism, resulting in their inability to funnel
money to terrorists openly;
3. Increase in
supply of heroin coming from Afghanistan;
4. Connections
between Islamic fundamentalists and organized crime syndicates
The Albanian factor
One of the main reasons the Albanian officials were eager to
form strong ties with the Muslim world was the hope that large investments from
the Gulf would ensure the uplifting of the decaying Albanian economy. Therefore
the religious sentiment of the majority of Albanians, mostly in the North, was
overplayed in order to gain capital from the Islamic world. Unfortunately no
serious investment initiatives were undertaken; instead the Al Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden, found another state to expand their illegal activities. Many
different and respectable sources have indicated two visits by Bin Laden in
Tirana that aimed into creating an Islamic platform for the country and the
construction of terrorist networks within the territory.
An Albanian called Naseroudin Albani played an instrumental
role in spreading extremist Islamic values into the Albanian society. He was a
fugitive from Albania
since 1963 and resided in Amman-Jordan[108].
Sources from Albania point
out that Albani organized radical Sunni sects back in the 70’s in the Middle East that became the nucleus of the modern day
Mujahedin. Another Albanian, the then head of the Albania ’s Secret service, SHIK,
called Bashkim Gazidente assisted into implementing radical Islamic agenda in
Albanian domestic policies. During the 1997 Albanian riots Gazidente fled from Albania
and he is said to be an instrumental part in global Islamic networks[109].
He fled presumably to a Middle Eastern country and currently he resides in
Rome-Italy treated in a local hospital due to chronic illness; according to
reliable regional sources[110].
The Al Qaeda factor in Albania was consolidated by the
creation of the Arabic-Albanian bank, in which Bin Laden allegedly invested the
sum of 11.4 million USD. This financial institution acted as a front cover for
the transfer of capital for Islamic activities within the country[111].
Just before Berisha’s political overturn in 1997, another Islamic institution
called “El Farouk”, acted as a recruitment agency for young Albanians, under
the pretext of a charity. One of the most dramatic indicators of the degree of
Islamic presence in Albania
is the militant Islamic training camp just outside Tirana, the same camp on
which Berisha relied in his unsuccessful 1998 coup of his rival Fatos Nano[112].
At this point it is interesting to note
that it was a well known fact around the international community of the nexus
between organized crime syndicates, terrorist cells and the KLA, operating
under and with Albanian assistance[113].
Actually Albania
was mainly used as springboard to neighboring Kosovo. In April 1999, some 500
Arab Mujahedeen were smuggled into the capital of Tirana. Their mission was to
conduct special operations against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. They entered
Kosovo from Northern Albania . The whole
operation was led by Bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri[114].
The Nairobi and Tanzania bombings of 1998 shocked the US
administration into taking some action, for the first time, do dismantle terrorist’s
networks. Soon, the pressure fell on Albania and in the October of the
same month individuals of Middle Eastern origin were rounded up and deported[115].
The head of SHIK, Fatos Clozi, admitted for the first the existence of
extremists in Albania
and promised the eradication of the terrorist nucleus.
The 9/11 attacks proved to be a fatal blow for the radicals
in Albania and the USA
forces have more or less neutralize any remaining cells[116].
The government of Albania ,
which is more than willing to become inducted in the Euro-Atlantic security framework,
has ceased to seek Islamic assistance and the current Berisha’s administration
has refaced its Islamic outlook into a modern European one[117].
Nevertheless, the Albanian-Islamic connection is now
concentrated in Kosovo, the very same province NATO forces are stationed! There
is an overwhelming variety of sources and reports that indicate a well
established fundamentalist presence in that area. It is a common secret in the
international community that the West kept a blind eye during the 1998-1999 Winter
where hundreds of Mujahedin joined the UCK forces and helped it expand[118].
Shaul Shay describes “The [Kosovo
Albanian] KLA enjoyed the support of former Albanian President Sali Berisha,
who regarded the war in Kosovo as a Jihad and issued a call to all Muslims to
fight for the protection of their homeland”[119].
At that period the means justified the end which was the
disbandment of the Russian influence in the Balkans, as the Clinton administration viewed the Milosevic
one. The result was a resurge of Islamic radical networks in the region, thus
eliminating the beneficial results of previous actions against it. Moreover Russia managed to regroup and it is still viewed
as a great player in South Eastern Europe .
The newly independent Montenegro nowadays faces a long term
Islamic population bomb and it is certain that should current trends continue,
in 2050 half of the population would be Muslim That is not of course a prelude
of terrorism action per se, but the overall turbulent Balkan history and the
existence of terror networks in nearby Kosovo do not assure a tranquil
political future for the newest Balkan state.
The FYROM is also another terrain where the delicate balance
between radicalism and Muslim secularism is taking place. Back in 2001, an
Albanian uprising nearly resulted in the disintegration of the state although
nowadays there is an uneasy stability. However any negative developments in
Kosovo will affect directly the country which is also the epicenter of the
Balkans by a geopolitical point of view.
Lastly the Sanjak area in Southern
Serbia is a territory to watch, where the Wahhabi strain of Islam
has gained tremendous influence in the local Muslim population. On March 2007 a
terrorist cell was disbanded by the Serbian authorities and a terrorist plan
was dwarfed at the last minute[120] .Again
Kosovo as the centre of radicalism in the Balkans could play the role of the
powder keg for any developments in Sanjak, against the Serbian population in
the region[121].
The complicated Balkan reality: the region is a mostly
secular one, but it has the peculiarity of hosting safe havens of terrorists
and organized crime related Islamists[122].
Most of these areas are under international protection a paradox that ridicules
the entire Western anti terror campaign. Another worrying fact is the real
danger of proliferation of chemical or biological weapons into the hands of
terrorists, especially in the case of Albania [123]. Already this threat is one of the top
priorities for the security services across Southeastern Europe, and Greece along with the USA ,
Italy , Switzerland , and the European Union; assists Albania
in destroying the stockpiles of its chemical weapons[124].
It is worthwhile to mention that the Albanian authorities had discovered 16
tons of chemicals in 2002, stored in an underground cache, but there are no
verified accounts if any amount had been stolen during the 1997 riots, thus
raising a question as to whether terrorist organizations already have taken
hold of quantities of chemicals.
Lastly, the attack on the USA Embassy in Athens-Greece with
an RPG weaponry, is assumed to have a Balkan-Albanian connection, meaning
source it came from, the “Weapons black market” vividly active in the
borderlines between Kosovo and FYROM.[125]
In lieu of a conclusion
The overall challenges for the security and intelligence
services, oriented in the Balkan region seems overwhelming, judging by the
multitude of the challenges involved and the tasks needed to overcome them. The
current époque has brought the re-engineering of security policies, in order to
combat non- symmetrical threats such as the ones of organized crime and
terrorism. Taking into account the globalization process, the interrelation
between societies and the breathtaking advancements in telecommunications and
transport; it is fair to assume that certain issues should be seriously
reflected upon, on a different perspective than the traditional mode.
A multiparty approach
to organized crime should be form here upon the core of any intelligence activity
in the Balkans. Organized crime & terrorism, need measures that are up to
the modern way of life and communication of ours. A parallel and well
constructed method of Open Source Intelligence gathering and the operation of
specialized crime intelligence units will certainly help towards the aim of
curbing crime and its calamities. In addition a conclusive analysis and
synthesis of the available information, without any bias; should be the core of
any serious attempt into reaching viable prognosis and stall malicious
situations such as terrorists incidents and further empowerment of organized crime.
In order for the aforementioned to become a custom reality,
there has to be a constructive and significant replenish of the human resources
involved and an upgrade of the present era technical equipment. Therefore
decisions should be taken soon enough so as to foresee any positive results,
before events surpass the ability of the intelligence community to react and
function properly. The Balkan Peninsula
remains more than ever “The soft underbelly of Europe”, apart from the other
more conventional menaces in the wider Eastern
Mediterranean area.
Bibliography:
Books & Academic literature
Alessandro Politi, “European Security: The New Transnational
Risks,”Chaillot Papers, No. 29, October, 1997
Blumi Isa,"Contesting the edges of the Ottoman Empire:
Rethinking ethnic and sectarian boundaries in the Malesore", International
Journal of Middle East Studies, 35, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge , 2003
Central European and Eastern Adriatic Research Group,
Research & Analytical Papers "Organized Crime in Southeast
Europe", Foreign and Commonwealth Office London , November 2002
Cpt. Velko Attanassoff, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Islamic
Revival, International Advocacy Networks and Islamic Terrorism, Strategic
Insights, Volume IV, Issue 5, May 2005
Cviic, Christopher.
Remaking the Balkans. New York :
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991.
Evan F. Kohlmann,
“Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe“,Berg Publications,
Oxford-UK, September 2004.
Galeotti, Mark.
2001. “Albanian Gangs Gain Foothold in European Crime Underworld.”
Jane's Intelligence Review 13(11, November): 25-7.
H.T. Norris "Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society
Between Europe and the Arab World", C. Hurst & Co, London , Jan 1994
International Crisis Group, “Bin Laden and the Balkans: The
Politics of Anti-Terrorism”, ICG Balkans Report No. 119, 9 November 2001
Kaplan, Robert D. “Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through
History”, St. Martin's Press, New
York , 1993.
M. E. Mallet and J. R.Hale, "The Military organization
of a Renaissance State :
Venice ca. 1400 to 1617",Cambridge
University Press,London ,
1984
Maltz D. Michael , "Defining Organized Crime", in:
Robert J. Kelly et al. (eds.), Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States ,
Westport/London, 1994
Mark Galeotti ‘Albanian Organized Crime: The Threat to Europe ,’ Cross Border Control Issue 12
Raufer, Xavier
avec Stéphane Quéré. “La Mafia Albanaise, une Menace pour l'Europe: Comment est
née cette Superpuissance Criminelle Balkanique” Lausanne, Favre, 2000.
Schindler John R. "Unholy Terror: Bosnia , Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global
Jihad", Zenith Press, Osceola
WI
Shay Shaul "Islamic Terror and the Balkans",
Transaction Publishers, New Jersey ,
December2006
Schwartz Stephen, “The failure of Europe in Bosnia
and the Continuing Infiltration of Islamic Extremists”, The Weekly Standard, 20 June 2005
Suha Taji-Farouki and Hugh Poulton "Muslim Identity and
the Balkan State", New York University Press, New York ,
October 1997 New York
Todd Stiefler, “CIA's Leadership and Major Covert
Operations: Rogue Elephants or Risk-Averse Bureaucrats?", Intelligence and
National Security, Volume 19, Number 4, Routledge, part of the Taylor &
Francis Group, London, December 2004.
Xenakis Sappho, "International Norm Diffusion and
Organised Crime Policy: The Case of Greece ", Global Crime, Volume 6, Issue 3 & 4
,P:345 - 373 ,London ,
August 2004.
Material used from Open Sources Intelligence (Media, Reports,
Presentations, Papers, Quotes,
Documentaries, Open Editions, Articles, Speeches, Reviews, Reports, Briefings,
Hearings, anecdotal data, statistics)
Albanian-Canadian Organization
American Council for Kosovo Organization
Antiwar Organization
Association of Breton & Celtic Journalists
Assyrian News Agency
Axis Global Research Corporation
Balkanalysis News Agency
BBC News
BIA-Security Information Agency in Serbia-
Bulgarian Helsinki
Committee Publications
Business Week Journal
CEMES Institute
Center for Contemporary Conflict
Centre for Drugs Research-University of Amsterdam -
Centre for European Reform
Centre for Peace in the Balkans
CERE Research Centre
Chicago-Kent College of Law and the Illinois Institute of Technology
CIA Publications
CIAO Organization
CNN
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship Publications
Council on Foreign Affairs
Counterterrorism Blog
Covert Action Journal
Der Spiegel Newspaper
DHKC Information Bureau
Drug Text Organization
European Commission -External Affairs Service-
European Communities Official Journal
EUROPOL Publications
Federation of American Scientists Publications
Foreign Military Studies Publications
Geopolitical Drug Watch Journal
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Global Policy Forum
Global Research Organization Publications
Journalismus -
Nachrichten Von Heute
Hellenic
Resources Organization
Independent
Newspaper
Indian Ministry of External Affairs
International Herald Tribune
Interpol Publications
Inthe80's.com
Irish Examiner Newspaper
ISSA -Defense & Foreign Affairs Journal-
Italian Parliament Publications
FBI Publications
Kathimerini Newspaper
Kokkalis Foundation -Kennedy School
Le Monde Diplomatique
Library of the USA Congress
Lobster Magazine
MSNBC News
Service
NATO Publications
Observatoire
Geopolitque des Drogues Foundation
Organization of Islamic Conference
Radio Free Europe
RAND Institute
Reuters News Agency
Rupert Schumann Foundation
National Post
New York Times Newspaper
Nexhat Ibrahimi
Partnership for Peace Consortium
Saudi Aramco Corporation Publications
Serbianna News Agaency
Sisyphe Organization
Strategic Culture Foundation
Strategic Insights Journal
Terrorism Monitor Journal
Transnational Organized Crime Journal
Truth in Media News Broadcast
Voice of America
News Service
West Network Organization
Wikipedia
United Nations Information Office in Vienna
United States Department of State
[1] Evan F.
Kohlmann (2004). Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network.
Berg.2004.NY, New York, US.
[2] Nigel
Thomas,K. Mikulan, The Yugoslav Wars: Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992-2001,
Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2006. p.9
[3] ICTY:
Summary of the judgment for Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura. he full
summary of the judgement as read out by Judge Antonetti can be found
at:www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm
[4] "Al Qaeda's Balkan Links", By Marcia
Christoff Kurop, November 2, 2001, http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/alqaedasB.htm
[5] Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How
Tehran Defies the West, Regnery Publishing, Washington DC, US. 2009p.132
[6] Dore
Gold, Hatred's kingdom: how Saudi Arabia supports the new global terrorism,
Regnery Publishing Inc, Washington DC, US, 2003.p.235
[7] Kenneth Morrison, Wahhabism in the Balkan,
Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Balkans Series 08/06 Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, 2008, p.5 http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/arag
[8] Russell
A. Berman,Herbert and Jane Dwight,
Freedom Or Terror: Europe Faces Jihad, Working Group on Islamism and the
International Order, Hoover Institute press publication, 2010, p.183-196
[9] Darko
Trifunovic , Financial Infrastructure of Islamic Extremists in the Balkans, 09/08/2008,
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/475/Default.aspx
[10] Egipćanin
okuplja vehabije u BiH, 21.Maj.2011,
http://www.vesti.rs/Vesti/Egipcanin-okuplja-vehabije-u-BiH-2.html
[11] Vodja
vehabijske zajednice u Bihacu pozvao Muslimane da osvete Osamu, by Ervin Felic,
17.05.2011. http://www.bihac-x.com/?p=6156
[12] "Wahhabism
in Bosnia-Herzegovina - Part One", By Juan Carlos Antúnez, Tuesday, 16
September, 2008, Bosnian Institute,
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2468
[13] "Bosnian Forces Conduct Massive Wahhabi
Raid", 8th of February 2010, By Anes Alic in Sarajevo for ISN Security
Watch,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=112328
[14] “Bosnian Forces Conduct Massive Wahhabi
Raid”, International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Zurich, Switzerland,
2010. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?lng=en&id=112328
[15]
Interpol official publication (2006), “Heroin production”, Website:
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Drugs/heroin/default.asp
[16] Council
of Foreign Affairs (09/2006), by Lionel Beehner; “Afghanistan ’s
role in Iran ’s
Drug problem”. Website: http://www.cfr.org/publication/11457/
[17] "Afghanistan
opium harvest at record high", 13 November 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24919056
[18] BBC
News Europe (03/08/2000 ),
“Albanian mafia steps up people smuggling”. Website:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/863620.stm
[19] Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress (12/2002), By Glenn E. Curtis & Tara
Karacan. Website: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf
[20] Website
of Xavier Raufer: http://www.xavier-raufer.com/
[21] The Washington Quarterly
Journal (09/1999), By Frank Cilluffo & George Salmoiraghi. Website: http://www.twq.com/autumn99/224Cilluffo.pdf
[22] EUROPOL Publications (2005), “EU Report
on drug production and drug traffiking 2003-2004. Web site : http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2005/SC2Drugs-2005.pdf
[23] CEMES
Institute (2004), “Balkan trafficking report”.
Website: http://www.cemes.org/current/ethpub/ethnobar/wp1/wp1-d.htm
[24] Sisyphe
Organization (02/2005), By Prof. Richard Poulin, “The legalization of
prostitution and its impact in trafficking of women and children”. Website: http://sisyphe.org/article.php3?id_article=1596
[25] Maltz
D. Michael , "Defining Organized Crime", in: Robert J. Kelly et al.
(eds.), Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States , Westport/London
1994, 21-37. ALSO for the particular Modus Opperandi of the Albanian criminal
groups see: Raufer, Xavier avec Stéphane Quéré. “La Mafia Albanaise, une Menace pour l'Europe: Comment est née cette
Superpuissance Criminelle Balkanique” P. 12-124, Lausanne, Favre, 2000.
[26] United
Nations Information Service in Vienna
(09/2004), “Nexus between drugs, crime & terrorism”. Website: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2004/uniscp500.html
[27] Xavier
Raufer (2002), “At the heart of the Balkan chaos: Albanian mafia”. Website: http://www.xavier-raufer.com/english_5.php
[28] BIA -Security Information Agency-
[29]
National Post (04/2000), By Patrick Graham, “Drug wars: Kosovo’s new battles”.
Website: http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=7582
[30]
Wikipedia (2007), “Albanians”. Website: http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanians
[31] Observatoire
Geopolitque des Drogues Foundation; Annual Report (1996) "The World
Geopolitics of Drugs".Page 61-75.
[32]
Wikipedia (2007), “Opium”. Website: http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opium
[33] FBI
Publications (2002), “Report on transnational narcotics trade”. Website: http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcn/ioc.htm
[34] Drug
Text organization, Reference library, By McCoy, “Marseille: America ’s heroin labatory”.
Website: http://www.drugtext.org/library/books/McCoy/book/11.htm
[35]
Federation of American Scientists briefing, “Kurds I Turkey”. Website: http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_background_kurds.htm
[36] The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th
Ed. (2001-2005), “Iran-Iraq war”.
Website: http://www.bartleby.com/65/ir/IranIraq.html
[37] Charles
R. Grosvenor Jr. (2007), “The Iran-Contra scandal”. Website: http://www.inthe80s.com/scandal.shtml
[38] Lobster
Magazine; Issue 30 (1995), “Persian Drugs: Oliver North, the DEA and Covert
Operations in the Mideast ”
[39] German
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (10/2006), “Profile of Turkey ”. Website: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laender/Tuerkei.html
[40] DHKC
Information Bureau (01/1997), “The Susurluk accident”. Website: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/289.html
[41] BBC
News (06/10/2005 ),
By Sarah Rainsford, “ Turkey
at the drugs crossroads”. Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4305692.stm
[42] West
Network organization (1998), “Corruption in Turkey ”. Website: http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/cillermurder.htm
[43] Le
Monde Diplomatic (07/1998), By Kendal Nezan, “Turkey ’s pivotal role in
international drugs trade”. Website: http://mondediplo.com/1998/07/05
[44] Centre
for Drugs Research-University of Amsterdam -
(1998), By Tim Boekhout Van Solinge, “Drugs use & trafficking in Europe ”. Website: http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/boekhout.drug.pdf
[45] Ibid
[46] Journalismus
Nachrichten Von Heute (11/12/2006 ),
"The Highjacking of a Nation", Quoting Mark Galeotti, a former UK
intelligence officer and expert on the Turkish mafia. Web Site:
oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/3049459
[47] Centre
for European Reform (07/2006), By Hugo Brady, “Organized crime & punishment”.
Web Site: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/brady_esharp_july_aug06.html
[48]
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship Publications, “Open Edition on Albanian people”.
Web Site: http://www.thefellowship.info/Global%20Missions/UPG/Albanian.icm
[49] CNN (26/10/2004 ), By Eric
Pearce, “Albanian crime rings suspects arrested”. Website: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/FDP/CNN-261004_1.html
[50]
Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (11/05/2005 ), “Bucharest
Declaration”. Website: http://www.mvpei.hr/seecp/docs/7_BUCHAREST_DECLARATION_11_MAY_2005.pdf
[51] Subcommittee
on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate
(30/10/2003), Testimony by Grant D. Ashley, Assistant Director, Criminal
Investigative Division, FBI, "Eurasian, Italian, and Balkan Organized
Crime". Website: http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/ashley103003.htm
ALSO see more on: Galeotti, Mark. 2001. “Albanian Gangs Gain Foothold in
European Crime Underworld.” Jane's Intelligence Review 13(11, November): 25-7.
[52] CIAO organization,
interview of Mark Edmond Clark in CIAO, “Terrorism and organized crime”.
Website: http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/clm10/clm10.html
[53] The
Center for Peace in the Balkans (06/2003), “Humanitarian bombing vs. Iraqi
freedom”. Website: http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/analysis/a14.incl
[54] Global
Policy Forum (2004), “Kosovo”. Website: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security//issues///ksvindx.htm
[55] Gus
Xhudo. (1996) "Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal
Activity." Transnational Organized Crime. 2(1). Spring: 1-20
[56] Website
of Xavier Raufer: http://www.xavier-raufer.com/
[57]
Wikipedia (2007), “Albanian Mafia”. Website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_mafia
[58] USA
Department of State (2006), Trafficking in person’s reports”. Website: http://www.state.gov/g/tip/
[59]
Albanian-Canadian organization (2006), “Dateline of Albanian history”. Website:
http://www.albanian.ca/datehistory.htm
[60]
Serbianna News Agency (19/04/2005 ),
By M. Bozinovich, “Al-Qaeda in Kosovo”. Website: http://www.serbianna.com/columns/mb/035.shtml
Strategic Culture Foundation Journal (03/04/2007 ), By Mikhail
Yambaev, " Kosovo-2007: Russia ’s
Moment of Truth". Web Site: http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=643
[62]
Congressional Research Service – The Library of the USA Congress- (26/07/2005 ), Report by Steven Woehrel,
Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense & Trade Division. “Islamic
Terrorism & the Balkans”. Website: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33012.pdf
[63]
Strategic Insights Journal, Volume IV, Issue 5 (05/2005), By CPT Attanassoff;
Bulgarian Armed Forces, “Bosnia
Herzegovina :
Islamic Terrorism”. Website: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/May/attanassoffMay05.asp
[64] Ibid.
[65] MSNBC
News Service (16/06/2004 ),
“9/11 Commission Staff Statement”. Website: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5224099/
[66] The
Irish Examiner Newspaper (14/07/2005 ),
“Explosives used in London
bombings originated in the Balkans”. Website: http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2005/07/14/story664838892.asp
[67] Assyrian
International News Agency (24/05/2007 ),
By Alan W. Dowd, "An Independent Kosovo?". Web site:
http://www.aina.org/news/20070523100735.htm
[68] NATO
Publications (06/1998), By Kosta Barjaba, " Albania in transition"
[69] USA TODAY Newspaper (2002), “Bin Laden linked to
Albania ”.
Website: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/bomb162.htm
[70] The
center for Peace in the Balkans (09/2001), “Bin Laden’s Balkan connections”.
Website: http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/analysis/a09.incl
[71] New
York Times Newspaper (10/06/2000 ),
“Stolen Albanian weapons”. Website: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E3DC1F3FF933A25755C0A9669C8B63&n=Top%2fNews%2fWorld%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fAlbania
[72] USA
TODAY Magazine; Society for the advancement of education (05/2002), By Ivan
Eland, “Provoking terrorist groups”. Website: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2684_130/ai_86062103/pg_1
[73] Novi Sad weekly Newspaper
"Nezavisni" (11/09/1998 ),
By Slobodan Inic, “Defeat of KLA in Kosovo". Website:
http://mediafilter.org/Monitor/Mon.66/Mon.66.nezavisni1.html
[74]
Balkanalysis News Agency; Security & Intelligence Brief-Part 1 (26/06/2006 ), By Christopher
Deliso, “Dragas pocket worries terrorism experts”. Website: http://www.balkanalysis.com/security-intelligence-briefs/06262006-dragas-pocket-worries-terrorism-experts/
[75] The Jamestown Foundation,
Terrorism Monitor Journal, Volume 4, Issue 12 (15/06/2006 ), By Anes Alic. “Al Qaeda’s
recruitment operations in the Balkans. Website: http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370031
[76] The USA
Embassy in Rome-Italy Publications , CRS Report (06/01/2006), By Kristin
Archick (Coordinator), John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, “ Islamic extremism in
Europe”. Website: http://www.italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS22211.pdf
[77] RAND
Institute Publications, Monograph (04/1998), Chapter 3, By Phil Williams,
“Transnational Criminal Networks”. Website: www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch3.pdf
[78]
Balkanalysis News Agency (17/04/2006 ),
Interview of Loretta Napoleoni by Balkanalysis, “Terrorist finance & the
Balkans”. Website: http://www.balkanalysis.com/?p=667
[79]
Official Journal the European Communities; Council Common Position (16/07/2001 ), “Concerning a
visa ban against extremists in FYROM”. Web site:
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:194:0055:0055:EN:PDF
[80] Axis
Global Research Corporation (11/10/2005 ),
By Can Karpat, AIA Balkan section, “Political Solution and Terrorism in
F.Y.R.Macedonia”. Website: http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=430
[81] University of Buffalo ;
Listserv Buffalo (04/03/2002 ),
By MILS News, “Seven terrorist killed near Skopje ”. Website: http://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0203a&L=maknws-l&T=0&P=298
[82] The Woodrow Wilson International
Center
[83] University of Belgrade ;
Faculty of Security Studies Publications (2002), By Prof. Drako Trifunovic,
“Terrorism and Bosnia and
Herzegovina - Al-Qaeda’s Global Network and
its influence on Western Balkans nations” P. 9-11.
[84] Washington Post
Newspaper (01/12/2005 ),
By Rade Maroevic and Daniel Williams, “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in Balkans”.
Website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113002098.html
[85] Ibid.
[86] The
Jamestown Foundation; Terrorism Monitor Journal; Volume II; Issue 20, (21/10/2004 ), By Stephen
Schwartz, “Wahhabism and al-Qaeda in Bosnia-Herzegovina”.
[87] PfP
Consortium; Study Group Crisis Management in South East Europe; Vienna and Sarajevo
(12/2002), By Alfred C. Lugert, “Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina ”
[88] University of Belgrade ;
Faculty of Security Studies Publications (2002), By Prof. Drako Trifunovic,
“Terrorism and Bosnia and
Herzegovina - Al-Qaeda’s Global Network and
its influence on Western Balkans nations” P. 16-17.
[89] Kokalis
Foundation; Kennedy School of Government; Harvard University
[90] United
Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Current as of 13/05/2007 ), “Bosnia & Herzegovina travel advice”.
Website: www.fco.gov.uk/.../ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590&a=KCountryAdvice&aid=1013618385675
[91] Evan F.
Kohlmann, “Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe “,Berg
Publications, Preface, Oxford-UK, September 2004.
[92] Kokalis
Foundation; Kennedy School of Government; Harvard University
[93] Foreign
Military Studies Publications (02/1995), By LTC John E. Sray, U.S. Army, “Mujahedin Operations in Bosnia ”.
Website: http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/muja.htm
[94]
Department of the USA Navy; Naval Historical Centre Publications (26/07/2005 ), By Steven
Woehrel, “Islamic terrorism & the Balkans”. Website: http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/islamic_terrorism.htm
[95] Ibid.
[96] Reuters,
Alert Net Service (11/04/2007 ),
By Daria Sito-Sucic, "Bosnia
revokes citizenship of Islamic ex-soldiers". Web Site:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L1151505.htm
[97]
Information was provided by a variety of ISSA Reports, informal journalist
sources from Serbia ,
Albania & FYROM. The material has been made publicly else were and has not
been contended for its reliability.
[98] For
extensive and sensitive information on the subject see: ISSA Special Report (17/09/2003 ). Web Site: http://128.121.186.47/ISSA/reports/Balkan/Sep1703.htm#App1
[99] Council
on Foreign Relations; Open Edition (13/02/2002 ), By David L. Phillips, “Keeping the Balkans
free of Al-Qaeda”. Website: http://www.cfr.org/publication/4344/rule_of_law.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F385%2Fbalkans
[100]
European Commission; External Affairs Service (2004), “The Contribution of the
European Commission to the Implementation of the EU-Central
Asia Action Plan on Drugs”. Website: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/drugs/hero.htm
[102] http://www.nato.int/sfor/media/2004/ms040830.htm
[103] http://www.danas.co.yu/20020906/dezurna.htm
[104] http://mediafilter.org/Monitor/Mon.55-56/Mon.55-56.Vreme2.html
[105] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jusuf_Prazina
[106] Patriot
League is a paramilitary organization of the Bosnian Muslims, at the beginning
of Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is established as a party
organization by General Sefer Halilovic and his associates, on May 2, 1991, and
not later than June 10, 1991, the meeting of Bosnian public servants from the
whole Yugoslavia is held in the Militia Hall. Many criminal elements that show
their patriotism by attacking people of nationality different from their own
enter this organization. They disguise their own goals as preserving the
sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its borders, and protecting the Muslim
population in case of war.
[107]
Organization of Islamic Conference (2007), memberships. Website: www.oic-un.org/about/members.htm
[108]
Center for Contemporary Conflict; Strategic Insights; Volume V; Issue 4
(04/2006), Anouar Boukhars, “ The challenge of terrorism in Jordan ”. Website: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Apr/boukharsApr06.asp
[109] ISSA
Research & Analysis Corporation; Defense & Foreign Affairs Special
Analysis (16/01/2006 ),
"Kosovo SHIK Directly Linked With Albanian SHIK Intelligence Organization”.
[110]
According to Stavro Markos, acclaimed Albanian journalist, correspondent for UK ,
French and Greek media.
[111]
Global Research Organization Publications (22/10/2003 ), By Michel Chossudovsky, “Regime
rotation in the USA ”.
Website: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO310B.html
[112]
Federation of American Scientists Publications (1998), By Milan . V. Petkovic, “Albanian terrorists”.
Website: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980000-kla-petkovic-terror.htm
[113] Alessandro
Politi, “European Security: The New Transnational Risks,”Chaillot Papers, No.
29, October, 1997. This paper discusses analytically the strong evidence around
the KLA’s tendencies towards criminal actions well before the U.S. intervention in Kosovo and
with the suffice knowledge by the international bodies. ALSO see an article by
the Independent newspaper (25/09/2002 ),
“Bin Laden linked to Albanian drug gangs”. Website: http://www.thedossier.ukonline.co.uk/Web%20Pages/INDEPENDENT_Bin%20Laden%20linked%20to%20Albanian%20drug%20gangs.htm
[114] Der
Spiegel, 24 September 2001 ,
p. 15
[115]
Federation of American Scientists Publications; Patterns of global terrorism
(1998), “Europe overview”. Website: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_98/europe.htm
[116] International
Herarld Tribune (22/12/2006 ),
"Albania
seizes assets of alleged bin Laden associate". Web Site:
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/22/europe/EU_GEN_Albania_Terror_Financing.php
[117]
Voice of America News Service (08/05/2007 ),
“Albania
supports War on terror”. Website: http://www.voanews.com/english/About/2007-05-08-albania-foreign-minister.cfm
[118]
Anti War Article & Analysis Organization (19/09/2001 ), By Christopher Deliso, “How Islamic
terrorism took root in Albania ”.
Website: http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso5.html
[119] Shay
Shaul "Islamic Terror and the Balkans",P. 82, Transaction Publishers,
New Jersey ,
December2006
[120]
For detailed information on terrorist sympathizers in the Sanjak area ( Names,
locations), see a GIS Security Briefing:
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/dfasa040307.htm (Reprint)
[121]
ISSA Research & Analysis Corporation; Defense & Foreign Affairs Special
Analysis (03/2007), By Darko Trifunovic, “Terrorism: The case of Bosnia ,
Sanzak & Kosovo”.
[122]
United Nations Information Service in Vienna
(01/10/2004 ),
Press Release SOC/CP/311, “UN warning on terrorism in the Balkans”. Website: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/soccp311.doc.htm
[123] Washington Post (20/01/2005 ), By John Stilides, "Albania 's Dangerous Past".
[124]
Boston Globe (o1/05/2006), By Jonathan B. Tucker and Paul F. Walker , “A long way to go in eliminating chemical
weapons”. Web Site: http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/05/01/a_long_way_to_go_in_eliminating_chemical_weapons/
[125]
Kathimerini Newspaper (07/02/2007 ),
“ Kosovo link to Embassy strike”. Web Site: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100012_07/02/2007_79818
