In the summer of 2014 ISIS released a video containing
a threat to start a war in Russia’s Chechen Republic and the whole Caucasus
region. The footage showed an insurgent speaking from a fighter’s cockpit at
the al-Tabaka Airbase near the city of Raqqa, Syria, claiming that the
extremist group was going to “liberate” Chechnya and the Caucasus.[1]
In October 2014 Omar al-Shishani, one of ISIS’ military commanders, threatened that Russia would become one of
the group’s next targets. On the phone with his father in Georgia, al-Shishani
said that he would have revenge on Vladimir Putin and that he would infiltrate
Russia with thousands of followers. [2]
In order to find a possible answer to such question it
is important to consider several elements:
1. In February 2015, during a U.S.-chaired summit
against violent extremism in Washington DC, the head of FSB, Alexander
Boratnikov, said that about 1,700 Russian citizens are currently fighting in
Iraq and that the number has nearly doubled since the previous year. [3]
A relevant number of these north-Caucasian jihadists
do not come directly from their home countries but they are rather members of
the Chechen and Daghestani diaspora in Turkey and Europe, as recent arrests
made in Austria and Germany show. [4]
[5]
Jihad in Syria and Iraq seems to be far more appealing
for Chechen and Daghestani militants who have a hard time waging war on Russia
in their areas of origin and this is an important exogenous element with one
clear implication: the chance that foreign fighters from the various north-Caucasian
republics succeed in bringing jihad back home is strictly related to the
possibility of their return back home, which so far seems unlikely to take
place in high numbers.
The Russian security services seem well aware of the
numbers and the identities of north-Caucasian jihadists fighting in Syria and
Iraq and in fact last month Russian authorities released another partial list
of Daghestani, Chechen and Ingush jihadists currently with ISIS, including date
and place of birth and even the month that they joined the ranks. [6] This could be read as a clear sign that
Moscow knows exactly what it’s doing on the foreign fighter issue.
2. The second element is endogenous as several Chechen
and Daghestani jamaat commanders have recently retracted their oath of alliance
(bayat) to Caucasus Emirate leader, Ali Abu-Muhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov), and
pledged loyalty to ISIS leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Various sources published lists of jamaat leaders that
are now allied with ISIS, six out of the eleven cited. [7]
Among them Sultan Zaynalabidov (Emir of Aukhovsky jamaat), Rustam Aselderov
(Emir of Vilayat Daghestan), Arslan-Ali Kambulatov (Emir of Shamil’kalinsky
sector) and Makhran Saidov (Emir of the Vedeno sector). [8]
[9]
On December 28th 2014, the leader of
Caucasus Emirate, Ali Abu-Muhammad, released a video where he warned other
organization members from siding with ISIS and expanding the “fitna” inside the
Emirate. A problem that has reached north-Caucasian militants even in Syria, as
explained by the website “Chechensinsyria”:
“Rivalry between North Caucasian factions of IS in
Syria and the CE began as far back as late summer 2013 when Umar Shishani and
his faction in Jaish alMuhajireen wal-Ansar grew closer to then-ISIS, with Umar
being appointed ISIS’s military emir in northern Syria. Umar and his faction
broke away from JMA in December 2013 and went over to ISIS, with JMA openly
aligning itself as the Syrian branch of the CE. Since then, the rivalry between
the two groups in Syria has continued to develop, based in the main on a power
struggle for control of North Caucasian militants in Syria but also partly
based on ideology: some IS North Caucasians have accused the CE of nationalism
and asserted that, with the establishment of the “Caliphate”, all jihadis
should fight with IS”. [10]
On one hand this clearly shows that the Caucasus
Emirate, already weakened by the elimination of its former historical leader,
Doku Umarov, by the total failure of putting into practice the Sochi Olympics
threat and the counter-terror operations of the Federal security forces, now
has to deal with an additional loss of forces due to jamaat who are fleeing for
ISIS. This flow of militants can be related in part to different approaches to
jihad that have emerged since 2012, to ideological frictions that can be
summarized in “nationalism vs Caliphate” but also in a progressive weakening of
the Caucasus Emirate that has brought disappointment among younger and more
radical jamaat leaders, who decided to embrace the ideology of ISIS.
On the other hand, the fact that some jamaat are
joining ISIS does not necessarily imply that al-Baghdadi’s group is gaining
strength or that ISIS is actually infiltrating Chechnya and Daghestan. It is
plausible to state that at this moment the internal divisions seem to be
leading more towards a dispersion of forces on both sides.
In addition it is important to consider that
Daghestan, which is considered Russia’s most problematic republic in relation
to terrorism, has seen a decrease by 20% of terrorist incidents in 2014, with
more than 180 jihadists eliminated and 200 arrests.
The Daghestani militias have recently shown lack of
high strategic capabilities by focusing mainly on ambush of police officers,
judges and security personnel and with the consequences of being subjected to
strong counter-terror operations. In Chechnya the militants didn’t achieve much
either and beyond the December 4th 2014 attacks in Grozny, there haven’t been any
significant terrorist attacks reported.[11]
[12]
In conclusion, it is plausible to state that due to
internal ideological and strategic divisions, lack of common goals, dispersion
and leakage of forces among north-Caucasian jamaats which must be summed to the
heavy counter-terror measures taken by the Federal security forces, it is
unlikely that in the short-medium term ISIS or Caucasus Emirate will succeed in
trying to carry out substantial jihadist campaigns against Russia.
Giovanni
Giacalone
is an Italian researcher and analyst in Islamic radicalism, lives in
Milan where he studies political Islam in Europe with a
close look at issues linked to integration, radicalism and relations
between
the various European Institutions and the Islamic organizations present
in Europe.He wrote this article in English for RIMSE.
[4] In January 2015 German police
arrested in Berlin two individuals of Turkish origin who were accused of
recruiting Russian and Turkish nationals for jihad in Syria and Iraq. (Ibidem)
[5] In January 2015 Austrian police in Krems
arrested a Russian national from Chechnya accused of fighting with Islamic
State. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/two-men-arrested-berlin-isis-syria
[11] On December 4th 2014 a group of
jihadists attacked a police check-point, entered the city and occupied the
"Press House" building in the city center and a nearby school. 14
policemen and 11 terrorists were killed. Aslam Byutukayev and his militia
claimed responsibility.
