Maghreb
The Maghreb’s
countries have started to capture attention since December 17, 2010 when
thousands of Tunisians protested against the former president Zine el-Abidine Ben
Ali. The "Jasmine Revolution", which took place in Tunisia after this tragic incident led both to the exile of the first Arab leader Ben Ali (Saudi Arabia) and, secondly, to the rapid spread of insurgency and other
desperate and angry Arab peoples of North Africa and the Middle
East where poverty, oppression and
corruption prevailed. Since December 2010 a lot has changed. Libya was split in two because of the civil war that caused
instability in the region, political Islamists won elections in Morocco, and in Tunisia there is a delicate
representative government after years of dictatorship.
Tunisia
Of all the Maghreb
countries, Tunisia
is the only one who has experienced the
biggest change and holds the promise of
creating a new political system based on representative government and
consensus. Ennahda’s decision in late 2013 to relinquish power was partially
influenced by the military coup d’état in Egypt, which ousted President
Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013, and the declining popularity due to rising terrorist
violence. Still, taken into consideration Tunisia’s past authoritarianism and
repression due to political Islamists’ regimes,
it was a move that saved the country from deeper polarization and political
violence[1]. Since then, Tunisia has made historic moves
forward, with another round of free and transparent parliamentary and
presidential elections. Several threatening challenges make Tunisia’s path
uncertain. Tunisia’s
greatest problem may be how to shift from an
economic system built to support authoritarianism, to a system that is more open to trade, economic growth, and job creation. But
structural problems also undermine Tunisia’s economic performance.
According to the World Bank, more than half of Tunisia’s economy remains closed or
is subject to entry restrictions, while low productivity, corruption, and
inefficiencies continue[2].
Tackling many of these economic problems requires political decisions that
could hurt well-established business interests, many of which support the new
government. The environment of growing insecurity in Tunisia and the whole region creates a heightened threat. The March
18 attack on the Bardo Museum, which killed more than 20 people, is a reminder
that Tunisia remains the meeting point of several radical currents including
homegrown militants, al Qaeda, the Islamic State group (ISG), and various jihadist groups fighting in Syria. In the meantime,
violence and instability in Libya
heighten security risks in Tunisia.
Greater political coordination between the government, military, and interior
ministry in late 2013 helped enable Tunisia’s security forces to launch
a more cohesive counterterrorism push on several fronts. The danger, however,
is that a strategy that relies too heavily on security or is seen as violating
human rights could trigger a reaction and greater sympathy for jihadi-salafists
and creates a new wave of radicalization.
Libya
The way to end Libya’s
multiple conflicts and most importantly the
fight between two rival governments is one of the biggest challenges in Maghreb. These conflicts are based on the question of
legitimacy; that is a battle over who has the authority to head Libya’s
central government and rebuild the country. Those who fought Qaddafi ask for
revolutionary legitimacy. Some claim legitimacy from elections. Hundreds of
militias claim legitimacy by force of arms or tribal affiliation. In the short
period since Qaddafi’s fall in October 2011, Libya has had three governing
bodies: the National Transitional Council (NTC), which formed during the
rebellion against Qaddafi; the General National Congress (GNC), which was
elected in July 2012; and the Council of Deputies (House of Representatives),
elected in June 2014. Throughout 2014, the legitimacy of elections, political
officials, and government decisions were doubted. The result was the creation of
two competing governments. Libya Dawn, a loose alliance of Islamists and
numerous militias associated with Misratan tribal forces, that controls Tripoli. The coalition
includes the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and members of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which once fought together
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan
and is nominated by the United
States as a foreign terrorist organization.
The Tobruk-based government, the House of Representatives, allied itself with
General Khalifa Heftar, a former Qaddafi officer who spent years in exile in the United States and was at one point
funded by the CIA to bring down Qaddafi[3].
Heftar calls for eradicating all Islamists, including those that have
participated in parliamentary elections, and in May 2014 launched air and
ground attacks against Islamist forces in the Eastern city of Benghazi. He has been accused of using
cluster weapons in civilian areas. Reality in Libya is more complicated than a
battle between Islamist and nationalist forces. It is unclear whether Libya
Dawn’s approach to jihadi-salafists might shift, leading to a military confrontation
at some point in the future. What is clear is that without future cooperation
between the Tripoli
and Tobruk governments, it will be difficult to root out the ISG and other
jihadi-salafists. Meanwhile, political insecurity threatens Libya’s energy.
Hydrocarbons account for nearly 96 percent of total government revenue and 98
percent of export revenue[4].
Production cuts due to violence and blockades of oil ports have caused a
significant drop in production and export. Over the long term, the
unreliability of Libyan oil exports, the current global oversupply, and price
pressures could hinder future government’s efforts to build a legitimate and functional
state system that provides security and basic services to its citizens. Without
considerable oil revenue, Libya
will be dependent on external aid. Libya’s conflict threatens all of
its neighbors. After decades of interfering in others’ internal affairs, Libya has
become an arena for proxy battles by external actors. While foreign governments
seek to shape political outcomes, local factions are manipulating outside
political and financial support for their own interests. This makes the establishment of a legitimate government controlling Libya’s
territory, security, and resources a discouraging challenge, which could take
years, if it is even possible.
Algeria
Algeria
has enjoyed a rare decade of political predictability and relative security
after years of violence and terrorism. The future, however, will be
complicated. Algeria is
largely surrounded by insecure borders and weak governments in Mali, Tunisia,
Niger, and Libya while its western border with Morocco remains
shut because of diplomatic conflict. On the political front, 78-year-old
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ushered in more than a decade of relative
calm, does not have a clear successor. Other senior regime figures are also
aging or ill, raising the ghost for some Algerians of an unmanaged, and
potentially violent, generational transition. Rising energy prices over the
last two decades enabled the government to unite its own different factions
around a shared source of income, pay off the country’s external debt, boost
foreign currency reserves, fund patronage networks, and buy off former
militants as part of a national reconciliation process[5].
Public demonstrations have failed to translate into structural political
changes, but the memories of the oil price collapse in the 1980s and its political
impact still weigh heavily on Algerian policymakers. In addition to the above, Algeria’s
overall oil and gas production is declining. Since 2006, lower production,
stagnant reserves, and higher domestic consumption have meant less oil and gas
for export[6].
While Algeria’s
domestic policy remains relatively stable, its regional policy has shifted in significant
ways. It has an old policy of non-interference in its
neighbors’ affairs and opposing foreign military intervention in the
region[7].
As a large and influential country, Algeria’s
decisions will echo throughout the Maghreb and
beyond.
Morocco
Morocco
successfully escaped the political instability that affected its North African
neighbors in 2011 by responding quickly to popular uprisings. Less than a month
after youth protests erupted in February 2011, King Mohammed VI launched a
series of political reforms granting enhanced parliamentary powers through a
new constitution. Later that year Morocco held parliamentary
elections won by the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist political
party that has competed in parliamentary politics for more than a decade. Yet rather than addressing Morocco’s socioeconomic challenges and demands
for greater transparency and economic equality, the reforms reinforced the
palace’s control of nearly every aspect of Morocco’s political, economic,
religious, and security affairs. These reforms split the opposition by offering
limited concessions that satisfied some but not everyone. Further, by allowing
the PJD to head the government for the first time, the king neutralized the
most organized political party that might oppose him. Through its electoral
victory, the PJD was transformed from being
the loyal opposition to the king’s chief defender, creating a mutually dependent
relationship between the PJD and the palace. Though
there is no serious call for revolutionary change at the moment, challenges emerge
on several fronts could disrupt Morocco’s
political stability. One challenge is tackling a long list of socioeconomic
problems. Morocco’s widely exposed reforms and impressive economic growth over
the last few years have largely benefited the ruling elite while failing to
fight corruption and create greater transparency, economic opportunity, and
equality. Many of these problems are deeply ingrained in Morocco’s power
structure and elite patronage systems. If the deeper issues of economic
inequality and opportunity are not solved, criticism to
the palace is likely to continue, posing political challenges and greater inquiry
of the king’s executive authority. Second, Morocco
faces the common regional challenge of growing radicalization, which has lured
an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Moroccan fighters to jihad in Syria since
2011. Morocco has battled
local jihadi-salafi cells in the past, and dozens of Moroccans fought with al
Qaeda during the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Morocco
has responded to growing radicalization with a program to promote a Moroccan
Islamic identity based on the centrality of the king and the Maliki School
of jurisprudence[8].
The objective is to make Moroccans to respect state religious ulema (religious
scholars) and by extension royal authority. One of the main challenges is
creating religious leaders and institutions that reverberate with young people
and provide a compelling alternative to the radical and rebellious message of jihadi-salafists. Morocco’s efforts are the most comprehensive,
but similar strategies are underway in Tunisia,
Egypt,
and the UAE. This component of what the U.S. government calls countering
violent extremism (CVE) is one of the most important government strategies to
fight radicalism. Every country in the region and European countries with
sizeable Muslim populations will be affected by Morocco’s success or failure and
will closely watch its development.
[1]
Haim Malka, “Maghreb Rising: Competition and Realignment”, (chapter 7), “Rocky
Harbors Taking stock of the Middle East in 2015”, A report of the CSIS
Middle East Program 2015 http://csis.org/files/publication/150403_Malka_RockyHarbors_chapter7.pdf
[2]
The World Bank, “Tunisia:
Development Policy Review,” May 24, 2014, 82, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/09/16/000456286_20140916144712/Rendered/PDF/861790DPR0P
12800Box385314B00PUBLIC0.pdf
[3] Heftar
called his force the Libyan National Army and allied himself with forces in Libya’s regular
army, including air force units stationed in the East. “The Unravelling,” New
Yorker, February 23,2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/23/unravelling.
[4] Crude
oil accounts for 79 percent of hydrocarbon exports. See U.S. Energy Information
Administration, “Libya,”
November 25, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY
[5] Haim
Malka, “Maghreb Rising: Competition and Realignment”, (chapter 7), “Rocky
Harbors Taking stock of the Middle East in 2015”, A report of the CSIS
Middle East Program 2015
http://csis.org/files/publication/150403_Malka_RockyHarbors_chapter7.pdf
[6] U.S.
Energy Information Administration, “Algeria,” July 24, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ag.
[7] Algeria has repeatedly opposed requests for
military intervention in Mali
and Libya.
“Algeria rules out military
intervention in Mali,”
Al Monitor, June 16, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
security/2014/06/algeria-mali-will-not-intervene.html
[8] Haim
Malka, “The Struggle for Religious Identity in Tunisia
and the Maghreb,” CSIS, May 2, 2014, http://
csis.org/files/publication/140502_Malka_Maghreb_Religious_Identity_Web.pdf.
Styliani Vlachopoulou earned her bachelor and master degrees in International and European Studies at the University of Piraeus. She wrote the present article for RIMSE.
